Bank-led restructuring in Poland : an empirical look at the bank conciliation process by Gray, Cheryl W. & Holle, Arnold
POLIcy  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1650
Bank-Led Restructuring  Poland's  Enterprise  and Bank
Poland  Restructuring  Program,
in Poland  adopted in 1993. halted the
deterioriation of the country's
. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~commercial  banks,  but its An Empirical  Look at the Bank  banklewrut  pos bank-led  workout process  has
Conciliation Process  done little to further the
operational restructuring or
Cheryl  W. Gray  privatization  of enterprises.
Arnold  Holle  Continued  work  is needed  to
build strong banks  that can





















































































































dPOLIcY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1650
Summary findings
Since 1992, Poland has been considered a model of  important achievements in this early period of transition,
commercial banking reform among transition economies.  and the Polish approach can serve in many ways as a
Its Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program (EBRP),  model for other transition economies.
adopted by Parliament in 1993, tried to force state-  Despite these strengths, the data suggest that the bank-
owned commercial banks to build institutional capacity  led conciliation process has had limited power to
and to take concrete steps to resolve their problem loans  promote  needed restructuring or privatization in firms.
- through workouts ("conciliation"), liquidation, loan  The agreements themselves were relatively
sales, or payback of the problem loans. To find out if the  unsophisticated and included few tangible requirements
workouts have lived up to their promise, Gray and Holle  for operational or management change. The first two
reviewed the process and initial outcomes of the bank-  years of implementation saw a slowdown (over earlier
led conciliation process in a sample of 62 enterprises - years) in the rate of layoffs, a decline in average
part of a larger sample of 139 firms subject to the EBRP.  operating profitability, and very little real privatization.
A companion paper  looks at experience with the other  The main impact of conciliation appears to have been to
resolution paths (bankruptcy, state enterprise liquidation,  reduce debt service and thereby give firms "breathing
court conciliation, payback, and sale of debt) under the  room." Weaker banks in particular tended to be more
EBRP.  lenient, swapped more debt for equity, and had greater
*  The outcome  of Poland's first experiment with bank-  difficulty forecasting future enterprise  performance.
led restructuring is decidedly mixed. The EBRP forced  The EBRP was a good start, but continued work is
banks to confront their problems, helped them build  needed to build strong banks that can impose effective
institutional capacity, and furthered the difficult task of  corporate governance on enterprises that need to
weeding out and closing clearly unviable firms. These are  restructure.
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Intoduction
Poland is one of the fastest reforming  economies  in Cental and Eastem Europe.  In 1990
the government  implemented  a strong  macroeconomic  reform  program  that liberalized  most
prices, devalued  and made the zloty partially  convertible,  and eventually  cut inflation. Although
the government  did not move as rapidly on privatization,  Polish state  enterprises  were forced to
react to declining  subsidies,' new competition  from imports,  a collapse  in traditional  trading
structures,  and the government's  stated commitment  to eventual  privatization.  They  reduced their
workforces,  shed unnecessary  assets,  worked  harder  to collect  overdue  receivables,  and took
other steps to try to stay in business  in the new environment. 2
Although  state enterprises  did begin the painful  process  of restructuring,  many were
heavily  burdened  by growing  debt. Some  debt was inherited  from socialism,  but for most firms
the debt originated  in the early days of reform. Firms looked  to bank credit  to address immediate
liquidity  problems-some managers  believing  that this reform  effort  would  be short-lived  like
previous  ones. While banks had some  incentives  to refuse  their requests,  in practice  it was easier
for them to provide further  working  capital  and not force firms  into liquidation. By late 1991  it
was clear:  For macroeconomic  reforms  to be sustainable,  they needed  to be accompanied  by
strong  banking  reforms  that would  sharply  reduce  the flow of bank credit  to problem firms.
In early 1993,  more  than a year  after the debt  problem  was clearly  identified,  the Polish
government  adopted  perhaps  the most far reaching  programs  of banking  reform  yet undertaken  in
any transition  economy. The program,  described  in greater  detail  below, attacked  the problem on
many fronts. It included  short-term  policy  directives  to curtail  indiscriminate  lending and
longer-term  policies  to change  the fundamental  incentives  of banks. And policy  was not the only
focus. The program  also addressed  some  issues of organization  and skill-enhancement  within
selected  departments  in the banks,  as well as legal processes  for debt  workouts.
One of the most innovative  features  of the reform  program  was a new process it
introduced-the  "bank conciliation"  procedure-for bank-led  workouts  of problem firms. This
process  has received  wide acclaim  from participants  and observers  both within and outside
Poland. 3 The primary  purpose  of this paper is to look carefully  at how the bank conciliation
process has functioned  in practice  by studying  both its procedural  aspects  and its initial impact
Polish  govermnent  subsidies  to enterprises  shrank  from more  than 16 percent  of GDP  in 1986  to 3.3 percent in
1992  (World  Bank, 1996).
2  Pinto et al. (1993), Belka, Schaffer,  Estrin and Singh  (1996).
3Kawalec et al (1994), Belka  (1994),  van Wijnbergen  (1995).
1on enterprise restructuring in a representative sample of firms. 4 Although a few studies have
summarized the outcomes of the process in some detail at the aggregate level, 5 none have yet
looked in detail at firm-level data.
The Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program (EBRP)
The Bad Debt Crisis in Poland
When Poland was a centrally-planned economy, credit was allocated to enterprises
through the offices of the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The NBP was a so-called 'mono-
bank', ie. exercising the functions of a central bank and of the whole commercial banking system
at the same time.  On February 1, 1989, nine state-owned commercial banks were formed out of
branches of the NBP.6  The loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were allocated to the new
state-owned commercial bank in their respective regions. 7 Most client relationships between
these banks and SOEs, therefore, predate the major reforms of the 1990s. They were formed by
this 1989 allocation and not from market-oriented processes of loan application, appraisal,
disbursement and supervision. In 1991, the nine state-owned commercial banks were
'commercialized', that is, transformed into joint-stock companies fully owned by the state
Treasury and controlled by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Throughout the first phase of
transformation, state-owned commercial banks continued to hold most SOE-debt and continued
to lend to 'their' SOEs, particularly if these SOE's found themselves in trouble.  As of September,
1992, approximately 67 percent of the US$7.5 billion that SOEs owed to the banking system was
owed to these 9 banks.8 In total, the nine banks accounted for about one-third of banking assets
in Poland in 1992.9
The portfolios of most of the nine state-owned commercial banks deteriorated sharply
during the recession of 1990 and 1991. By end 1991, 9 percent of the credit portfolio in the best
bank was considered doubtful or lost, while in the worst the figure was as high as 60 percent'".
For an analysis of other debt resolution  paths included  in the reformn  program,  including  bankruptcy  and state
enterprise  liquidation,  see Gray and Holle (1996).
5 Pawlowic  et. al. (1994) and (1995).
6  The nine, in order of the size of total assets  as of end-1995,  are: Powszechny  Bank Gospodarczy  SA (Lodz),
Powszechny  Bank Kredytowy  SA (Warsaw),  Bank Slaski  SA (Katowice),  Bank  Przemyslowo-Handlowy  SA
(Krakow),  Wielkopolski  Bank Kredytowy  SA (Poman), Bank  Gdanski  SA (Gdansk),  Bank Zachodni  SA
(Wroclaw),  Pomorski  Bank Kredytowy  SA (Szczecin),  Bank  Depozytowo-Kredytowy  SA (Lublin). Although  four
of them have been privatized,  this paper will continue  to refer to the nine as the state-owned  commercial  banks, as
the problems  they have faced  were similar  enough  to consider  them as a group.
7 This geographical  allocation  of portfolios  into a relatively  high  number  of quite  small  banks  is considered  by
some to have  been the major  drawback  of this first Polish  banking  reform.
The rest was owed  to the foreign  trade bank,  the savings  bank, the foreign  currency  deposit  bank,  the agricultural
bank, a few smaller  majority  state-owned  banks,  and many small  private  and cooperative  banks.
Polanski,  1995.
10 The data are from audits  by major  international  accounting  firms carried  out in 1992.
2NBP data (supported by the findings of western auditors) indicate that the number of problem
debtors owing money to state-owned banks increased six-fold between 1989 and 1990, five-fold
again in the next year, and twice again in 1992". Roughly five out of eight SOEs were not
servicing their debt properly as of end- 1992,  2 and the emerging private sector probably had an
even worse debt service record.  For the entire banking system, bad debts were at least PZL40
trillion in 1992, ie. a little less than US$2 billion.' 3 This was at least 20 percent of the total stock
of bank debt of PZL204 trillion.
Bank debt was not the only debt in arrears.  Overdue payments to the government were
even higher-on  the order of PZL50 trillion as of end-1992.  And both bank and government
debt were dwarfed by overdue inter-enterprise debt, which one source estimates to have been as
high as PZL200 trillion in that year.'4
The Government's Reponse
The Polish Ministry of Finance began to put pressure on the banks to arrest the
deterioration of their situation.  All nine banks were instructed in 1992 to establish work-out
departments, staff them adequately, assign them those loans qualified as doubtful or loss,
5 and
take action to recover these loans.'6 The heads of the new workout units were chosen by the
government from outside and automatically obtained membership in the banks' management
boards.  The banks were advised in early 1992 to stop lending to these customers and were
instructed later in 1992 to provision fully against all loans to them.' 7 At the same time,
preparations were made to implement a comprehensive restructuring program, addressing the
problems at both the banks and the enterprises.
The Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Law, which put much of the EBRP into law, was
adopted by the Parliament on February 3, 1993. Its requirements applied to seven of the nine
commercial banks, although other banks could use the workout process it provided.  Two of the
nine banks-Wielkopolski  Bank Kredytowy and Bank Slaski-were  soon to be privatized and
were not generally subject to the law's requirements.  Its stated objective was to restructure and
privatize, under the banks' command, a group of financially troubled enterprises, mostly state
enterprises and majority state-owned joint-stock companies in the industrial sector. While new
"  See NBP-Bulletins  1990  to 1992,  quoted  from Wyczanski  (1993),  p. 49.
12  Wyczanski  (1993).
13 Groszek  et al., p. 5.
14 Groszek  et al (1993),  p. 6. This estimate  of PZL200  trillion  could  be a bit high. Total  debt  to government  and
suppliers  at end-1992  was  PZL84  trillion  and  PZL231  trillion,  respectively,  according  to government  (GUS)  data.
5 See World  Bank (1993),  p. 23.
16  It would  appear  from  our  data,  however,  that  not  much  happened.  See  discussion  on  page  15.
17  "Order  No. 19", issued  by the National  Bank  of Poland  in  November  1992,  required  banks  to form  reserves
against all new exposure  to these companies.  Because  this order  proved  so difficult  for the banks  to carry out
quickly,  the date by which full provisioning  was required  was eventually  extended  to March  31, 1994.
3lending to these loss-makers  had already  been reduced  in 1992,  the EBRP  intended  to force
banks into a more  proactive  corporate  restructuring  role. For the first time,  the bankruptcy  and
liquidation  system was to be fully  put to the test for state-owned  enterprises. The government
did retain  the option,  however,  of subsidizing  a limited  number  of firms  to avoid extreme  social
and political  problems."
A central feature of the EBRP was a one-time  recapitalization  of the banks, designed to
be large enough to ensure adequate  capital and make credible  the "one-time-only"  promise. 9
The amount of each bank's recapitalization  was based on the value of its portfolio of bad debts
at year-end 1991, as identified  in audits conducted  in 1992  by international  accounting  firms. 20
This was designed to avoid penalizing  those  banks that had already taken aggressive  action to
deal with their problems  and to maintain  incentives  for managers  to oversee other loans in the
bank's portfolio.
The EBRP  also included  many other  actions  designed  to change  the incentives  facing
both banks and enterprises. It gave the full force of law to the existing government  stance
against new lending  to nonperforming  borrowers. To enforce this, and to increase
transparency  more generally, it required  banks to undergo another portfolio  evaluation  by
outside auditors. It also ordered the banks to set up workout departments  and take actions to
resolve those loans that had been classified  "nonperforming"  at year-end 1991. Five
"resolution paths" were stipulated  in the law.  By the end of March, 1994 (later extended  to
end-April), each bank was required to take action so that for each firm with a loan in the base
portfolio (as described  below) either:
is The so-called  "Intervention  Fund",  see World  Bank (1993), p. 60.
19 The recapitalization  of the seven state-owned  commercial  banks  was implemented  in September  1993  and
totaled  PZL  II trillion.
0 The first set of audits  by international  auditing  firms  was carried  out for all nine banks in the summer  of 1991. A
respresentative  sample  of loans  was analyzed  and categorized  into one of five credit  ratings  based  on the debtor's
financial  standing  and its repayment  history:
Debtor's financial standing:  Timeliness of repayments: 
good  average  bad
very good  pass  watch  substandard
good  watch  substandard  doubtful
average  substandard  doubtful  loss
below average  doubtful  loss  loss
bad  loss  loss  loss
The audits of Wielkopolski  Bank  Kredytowy  (Poznan)  and Bank Slaski  (Katowice)  showed  significantly  better
health than those of the other  seven,  and these  banks  were slated  for early  privatization. In the aggregate  the other
seven  were estimated  to be insolvent. Loans  that were "doubtful"  or "loss" made  up between  24 percent  and 60
percent of the credit portfolio  of these banks. The audits  were repeated  in mid-summer  1992  and (for  the seven
banks  still in state hands) again  in 1994.
The recapitalization  was based on the status  of the loan portfolio  as of end-  1991,  as measured  in the 1992  audit. It
was implemented  in late 1993  and provided  the seven  banks with  PZLI  I trillion  (approximately  US$520  million)  in
fifteen-year  treasury  bonds,  enough to raise  their capital adequacy  to 12 percent  of 1991  risk-weighted  assets  under
BIS guidelines.
4* a court or bank conciliation  agreement  had been concluded  (see below);
*  the debtor had been fully servicing  its debt  for at least the last three months;
*  the debtor had been declared  bankrupt;
*  liquidation  had been initiated  under  the Privatization  Law (i.e. privatization  is
pending)  or under  the law on SOEs  (ie. the enterprise  is being shut down) ; or
*  the debt had been sold on the fledgling  secondary  debt  market.
These direct mandates  were accompanied  by other less direct changes  in bank
incentives. In 1992  employees  in firms being privatized  had been given the right to obtain
shares in their firms upon privatization  on favorable  terms. The EBRP  envisioned  privatization
of all of the state-owned  commercial  banks. This-combined with incentive  compensation
schemes  by managers and explicit promises  by the government  to fire uncooperative
managers-strengthened the incentives  of managers  at solvent  banks to adopt prudent policies
with respect both to the workout of the existing loan portfolio  and to the creation of new loans.
21 One bank was privatized in 1993, another in 1994, and two more in 1995.
While the EBRP made efforts to deal with incentive  problems, some issues were not
addressed. The government  did not force radical  changes in the banks' senior management,
although  in a few cases top managers  were changed. The reform program focused  heavily on
working out bad debts, but little on correcting  deficient  lending  procedures. Large segments
of the financial  system initially  escaped coverage, including  the problem-plagued  agricultural
bank, housing bank, cooperative  banks, and private banking  sector.  Taken together, however,
the reforms contained  in the EBRP  were an impressive  and forceful start.
The Bank Conciliation  Procedure
The focus of this paper is on one of the "resolution  paths" provided  under  the EBRP-the
bank conciliation  procedure. This is a workout  process similar  to formal  workout  processes  in
other countries,  such as Chapter 1  1 in the U.S. bankruptcy  code  or the "bankruptcy"  procedure  in
22 Hungary.  From a public policy perspective,  these procedures  are intended  to promote
reorganization  of firms whose going concern value (post-reorganization)  exceeds their
liquidation value. Such firms, for example, may have assets (such as specialized  machinery  or
unique trademarks)  with little value in alternative  settings.  Through these processes a problem
debtor tries to negotiate  a reduction  in immediate  debt service  requirements  as a means to keep
the firm alive.  In return for the reduction in debt service, creditors  may insist  upon partial
payments, upon equity stakes, or upon fundamental  changes  in the size or functioning  of the
firm in order to increase their chances  of future repayment  of the remaining  debt.
21 Wielkopoiski  Bank Kredytowy  (Poznan)  was privatized  in 1993,  Bank  Slaski  (Katowice)  in early 1994, and
BPH (Krakow)  and Bank Gdanski  (Gdansk)  in 1995. To encourage  privatization  of the commercial  banks, donor
countries  contributed  roughly US$500  million  to the Polish  Bank Privatization  Fund. As banks are privatized,  the
funds are released to the Polish  government  to cover payments  on the recapitalization  bonds. The extent  of
employee  purchase  of shares  in these  bank privatizations  varied  greatly.
22  For an in depth analysis  of the Hungarian  bankruptcy  process,  see Gray,  Schlorke,  and Szanyi  (1996).
5Poland's bank conciliation  procedure 23 was designed as a temporary  process 24 to bypass
some of the shortcomings  of its existing  judicial debt workout procedure, the law on
"Arrangement  Proceedings".  The latter dates from 1934 (although  significant  amendments
were made in 1990) and is extremely  inflexible.25  The bank conciliation  procedure shifts
power from the courts and the borrower to the banks. Banks  are empowered  to negotiate
workout agreements  with problem debtors and force them on dissenting  creditors, provided
creditors representing over 50 percent of the value of outstanding  debt agree. A firm can
apply for the procedure to its leading  bank creditor, as long as that creditor  holds 20 percent
of that firm's debt (or 10 percent if the amount  is at least 1 billion zloty). The parties then
negotiate  whether to pursue this route or opt for one of the other choices provided  under the
EBRP.
Borrowers and/or certain creditors  acquire several  potential  advantages  if they opt for
restructuring  under bank-led  conciliation  rather than judicial conciliation. First, the process is
likely to be somewhat  quicker and less cumbersome,  because  the courts are not involved
except to hear an appeal against an agreement.  Second,  priority rules change. The state
Treasury loses its superpriority.  The social security  office, secured  creditors, and unpaid
workers remain outside  the agreement26  and thereby retain their security (and thus their
implicit  priority). Third, the ability of small creditors  to block agreements  is more limited
because of the lower voting majority required for an agreement  to be approved. Fourth,
responsibility  for monitoring  the restructuring  program is explicitly  delegated  to the lead bank.
If the lead bank does not terminate  the agreement  when the restructuring  plan is violated, it
becomes  liable for any additional  losses incurred by the other creditors. Fifth, the range of
potential  outcomes  is broader under bank-led  conciliation. For example, creditors may
exchange  debt for equity. The designers  of the EBRP  hoped  that debt-equity  swaps would  be a
central  feature of many  bank conciliation  agreements,  allowing  debtors  immediate  relief from
23  For an in depth description,  see Kawalec  et. al. (1994)  and van Wijnbergen  (1995). For a preliminary
analysis  of results, see Kawalec,  et. al. (1995), Belka  (1994), and (in Polish)  Pawlowicz  et. al. (1994) and
Pawlowicz  et. al. (1995).
24  The process  was valid for three  years. Conciliation  agreements  could be negotiated  until March 18, 1996.
25 For example, workouts  under this law exclude  secured  creditors  and government  creditors  (such as tax and
social  security  offices), and thus in most cases the proceeding  covers  only  trade creditors  and bank creditors  (to
the extent  they give up any security  interests). In addition,  the procedure  requires  only financial  terms in the
resulting  agreement. Broader restructuring  provisions,  such as changes in employment,  investment,  or
management,  are not envisioned. Any agreement  must be approved  by a two-thirds  majority  (in terms of value  of
claims), or four-fifths  for write-offs  greater  than 40 percent. Finally, only  parties attending  the proceedings  are
allowed  to vote on the proposed  agreement. It may be very difficult  for a debtor with many creditors  to assemble
the required  majority in one place for the vote.
26  Secured  creditors  can choose  to forego  their security  and become  part of the process,  as most indeed  did-due  to
the virtual  impossibility  of collecting  debts by foreclosing  on collateral  in Poland  (see  Baer and Gray, 1996). The
social  security  office  (ZUS)  can and typically  does negotiate  a separate  agreement  with  the problem  debtor.
6debt service while also facilitating their privatization"7  (once the banks themselves were
privatized).  Finally,  if the conciliation agreement is declared void, any concessions are
unwound, and the original debt claims of all creditors are reinstated.  This gives the borrower
and the lead bank strong incentives to develop a reasonable plan.
The "Base Portfolio" and Sample Selection
This paper examines the bank conciliation procedure in action by looking at how it
operated in a sample of 62 finns.  These 62 form part of a larger stratified sample of 139 firms
drawn from the universe of firms with debts to the banks larger than PZL1 billion classified
(based on the results of a 1992 audit) as doubtful or loss as of year-end 1991.28  In the case of the
seven banks that remained in state hands, this is the universe of firms and debts-the  latter
defined as the "base portfolio"-covered  by the EBRP.  For WBK and Bank Slaski, the two
banks slated for early privatization, the names of firms or size of the bad loan portfolio were not
available to the authors. For the seven state-owned commercial banks, the base portfolio included
some 787 firms29  with loans totalling about PZLI 6 trillion, or US$1.43 billion.
Sample Stratification and Selection
The overall sample of 139 firms includes 130 firms from the seven state-owned banks
and 9 from the two privatized banks.  The sample of 130 constituted about 17 percent of the total
number of firms in the base portfolio of the state-owned banks.  It was stratified to include some
firms from each bank and at least 10 firms in each resolution path, with a special concentration
on bank-led conciliation cases.  Cooperatives, companies in the defense industry, and a few
intensely political cases were excluded from the sample. To the extent possible, cases were
drawn at random subject to these criteria.30 Although firm participation in the survey was
voluntary, the response rate was generally high, in part because many firms were asked directly
by their banks to participate. This was particularly true in the bank conciliation cases, where 69
percent of the firms initially contacted by mail agreed to participate without further prodding.  Of
the 62 conciliation cases finally included, 53 had responded positively to the first random
mailing.  While the sample may be slightly biased toward firms in better financial condition, we
believe that overall it is quite representative of the universe of firms that went through the bank
27  The Ministry  of Privatisation  was required  by the law  to give  consent  to debt-equity  swaps  contained  in
conciliation  agreements. In practice  the process  of obtaining  such  consent  was very  slow.
28 This is largely  but not entirely  true. We now know that some  loans were added  to or deleted  from this portfolio
after the mid-1992  audits.
29 The total number  of firms in the base  portfolio  varies  between  775 and 795  over  time and depending  on the
source  of data. Our data base contains  787  finns.
°  The selection  was  random  in six banks  for which  the authors  had access  to a complete  list  of their base
portfolios.  The other state-owned  commercial  bank and one privatized  bank chose the sample. The other  privatized
bank did not cooperate  in the study.
7conciliation procedure.
Origins of Base Portfolio Loans
When were the loans made, and on what terms?  As shown in Table 1, almost three
quarters of the bad loans owed to the banks by the 139 firms in the sample-and  almost four-
fifths of loans from 1989 on-were  working capital loans.  Less than one-fifth of the loans were
disbursed before the split-up of the National Bank of Poland in 1989. Almost two-thirds of the
loans originated in 1990 and 1991, the two years of heavy lending before the adoption of banking
reforms.  Even though the banks were advised by the Ministry of Finance in early 1992 and
required by the EBRP law in February 1993 to stop lending new principal to enterprises whose
loans had been classified as "doubtful" or "loss", we found 22 cases (about one-eighth of all
firms) where loans were made in 1992 or 1993.31
Table 1:  Date of Credit Agreement  and Type of Loan
Branch  of National  One of the nine
Bank  of Poland  commercial  banks
unknow_n  pre-1989  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  Total
Working  capital loan  10  1  2  24  34  13  7  91
Investment  loan  1  10  6  9  7  1  0  34
unclear  4  0  0  6  3  1  0  14
Total  15  11  8  39  44  15  7  139
Sample Distribution: Resolution Paths and Main Banks
The 787 firms in the base portfolio of the seven state-owned banks and the final sample
of 139 firms are broken down by resolution path as shown in Table 2.  We oversample for
conciliation cases (in terms of number, but not in terms of amount of bank debt33  ) because we
want to study that process in depth.  We undersample for good clients, which are by far the
largest EBRP group in terms of numbers.  The percentage of cases in our sample from other
resolution paths is similar to the overall percentage in the EBRP universe.  With regard to bank
coverage, cases in all resolution paths were taken from at least four banks to try to get as broad
and representative a view as possible of the EBRP program in Poland.  However, there was some
concentration in certain banks that were more cooperative than others.  The breakdown of the
139-firm sample by bank is shown in Table 3, and the breakdown of the 62 conciliation cases by
31  In all but one case these  were rollovers  of existing  working  capital loans  into "new" loans  of equivalent  amounts.
32 In those cases  the disbursement  date was unknown  to the firms and  they were unable to find the credit
agreements. It can be assumed  that disbursement  took place  before 1989.
33 If measured  in size of bank debt,  the bank conciliation  sample  is representative.  Firms  in the bank conciliation
process  held 46 percent of the bank debt in the base  portfolio.
8bank is shown in Table  4.  Six banks are well-represented  in the 139-firm  sample;  from 14  to 32
cases  were drawn  from each (representing  from 12 to 46 percent  of their total EBRP  cases).
Three banks are clearly  underrepresented,  with only 6, 2, and 1 cases,  respectively.
Table 2: The 139-Firm  Sample  by Resolution  Path
Share  of 787  Number  of  Share  of  Number  of banks from
Resolution  path:  enterprises  in "base  enterprises  sample  which cases  were taken
portfolio"  in sample
Repayment  / good  40%  22  16%  6
clients 34
Bank Conciliation  23%  62  45%  8
Court  Conciliation  2%  10  7%  4
Sale of Debt*  8%  10  7%  7
Liquidation  5%  12  9%  5
Bankruptcy  17%  23  17%  8
Other  5%  0  0%
*Completed  or attempted  sale  of debt
Tables 3 and 4 also categorize  the 9 banks into two groups,  based on their financial
condition  in 1993  when final decisions  were taken on the resolution  paths  of most base loans and
when conciliation  agreements  began  to be negotiated.  Of our sample  of 62 conciliation  cases, 26
(42 percent)  involve  weaker  banks, and 36 (58 percent)  involve  stronger  banks. Our assessment
of financial  condition  is based on four indicators: (1) risk-weighted  capital  adequacy  in 1993
(when  the agreements  were being negotiated),  (2) change  in risk-weighted  capital  adequacy
1991-93,  (3) percentage  of the 1991 loan  portfolio  rated doubtful  or loss, (4) change  in
percentage  of loan  portfolio  rated doubtful  or loss 1991-93  (see Appendix 1). In our view,  those
banks which had adequate  capital  in 1993  or a relatively  smaller 1991  bad loan portfolio  to be
worked out, or which  had already shown  an ability to improve  either  or both, were better placed
to tackle the work-out  effort successfully.  The two privatized  banks were automatically  included
in the "strong" category. They  were the first banks to be privatized  both because  their situation
in 1991 was clearly  better  than that of the other banks and because  they were viewed  to have
better  risk assessment  and bad loan workout  skills. The three banks classified  as weak have dim
prospects  for privatization  in the near future  and will be consolidated  with Pekao S.A., the former
savings  bank for hard currency,  under a plan signed  into law on July 16, 1996  and now being
implemented by the Ministry of Finance.
34 There are three different  groups  of debtors  in this category: Some  debtors  had not been late on their payments
before 1992,  but their financial  standing  was weak. Another  group  were indeed  bad debtors  in 1991  but later  paid
their debt back in full. A third  were bad debtors  but later  became  current  on their payments.
9Table 3: Distribution  of Base Portfolio  (787) and Sample  (139)
Financial  Number  of  Number  of  Share  of surveyed  Bank's
condition*  enterprises  in  enterprises  enterprises  in bank's  share in
base portfolio  surveyed  base portfolio  total
sample
Bank I  weak  72  14  19%  10%
Bank  2  weak  69  32  46%  23%
Bank 3  weak/adequate  158  19  12%  14%
Bank 4  adequate/strong  111  32  29%  23%
Bank 5  strong  146  6  4%  4%
Bank 6  strong  N.A.  14  N.A.  10%
Bank 7  strong  100  2  2%  1%
Bank 8  strong  131  19  15%  14%
Bank  9  strong  N.A.  1  N.A.  1%
Total  787  139  17.7%  100%
*Banks 3 and  4 are in the middle  in our consolidated  measure  of fnancial condition. Bank 4, the stronger  of the
two (with a much higher  capital ratio and  more improvement  in its capital  position  and loan portfolio),  has been
classified  with  the strong  banks  for purposes  of our analysis. Bank 3 (which  had an extremely  high level of bad
debts in 1991)  has been classified  with  the weak banks.
Table 4: Distribution  of Bank Conciliation  Cases  (62) over Nine Banks
Financial  Number  of bank  Number  of bank  Share  of  Bank's share
condition  (see  conciliation  conciliation  bank's total  in total
Table 3)  agreements  signed  agreements  in  in sample  sample
as of April 1994  sample
Bank 1  weak  41  7  17%  11%
Bank 2  weak  28  1  1  39%  18%
Bank 3  weak/adequate  20  8  40%  13%
Bank 4  adequate/strong  38  18  47%  29%
Bank 5  strong  13  5  38%  8%
Bank 6  strong  N.A.  8  N.A.  13%
Bank  7  strong  20  2  10%  3%
Bank  8  strong  20  3  15%  5%
Bank 9  strong  N.A.  0  0%  0%
Total  180  62  30%  100%
We would like to emphasize  that  the assessment  of a bank as "strong" or "weak" does not
necessarily  reflect only (or even  primarily)  the quality of its management.  The regional  allocation
of portfolios  to banks made  risk spreading  particularly  difficult  for bank managers. The various
banks inherited  portfolios  of differing  qualities  and clients  with diverse  futures,  and they
10operated  in regional  economies  with varying  growth  potentials. In the words  of one bank
manager:  "A commercial  bank with a substantial  loan  portfolio  can only be as good as the
financial  standing  of its clients." On the other hand,  a deterioration  in the loan  portfolio  and
capital  position from 1991  and 1993  may indeed  indicate  weakness  in bank management. 3 5
Characteristics  of 62 Sample  Firms
Which  Firms Entered  Bank  Conciliation?
The EBRP  provided  numerous  avenues  through  which  banks and problem  debtors could
tackle their bad debt  problems. In theory,  the firms in the worst financial  state-that  is, those
with debts  exceeding  assets and with liquidation  value  higher than value as a going concern-
should  have entered either  bankruptcy  or state enterprise  liquidation. Other  firms, in contrast,
should  have  resolved  their debt problems  through  means  that would  keep them alive-either
paying  back  debts, becoming  current  on their debt servicing  obligations,  entering  into one of the
two workout  processes  (bank  or court  conciliation),  or having  their debt sold on the secondary
market. For purposes  of this paper,  we concentrate  primarily  on the characteristics  of firms  that
entered bank conciliation.
Sctoral distribution.  Overall  the decision  for a firm to enter bank conciliation  does not
appear  to have been heavily  affected  by the sector  in which  it operates. Figure 1 shows  a
breakdown  of the 139-firm  and 62-firn samples  by sector. Although  there is a significant
concentration  of both among  2 sectors-textiles and machinery  and equipment,  the distribution
among  sectors is roughly  equivalent  for both samples  (with  the exception  of firms  producinm
fabricated  metal products,  of which a lower  percentage  in our sample-and  in the universe  -
entered  bank conciliation  than other  resolution  paths).
Figure  1: Sample  distibution  among  industrial  sectors
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35 The top managers  of at least  two of the strong  banks,  but none of the weak banks,  were changed  in 1991  or 1992.
36 Pawlowicz  (1994).
11Amount  of debt. Table  5 divides  the base portfolio  among  resolution  paths  both by
number  of firms and by size of debt.  While  only 23 percent  of firms entered  bank conciliation,
they accounted  for 46 percent  of the base portfolio. Enterprises  in other  resolution  paths  had far
lower  levels of bank debt on average  (between  PZL9  billion and PZL  17 billion per firm,
compared  with PZL41  billion for firms  in bank conciliation 37).
Table 5:  Share of Debt by Resolution Path for all 787 EBRP Firms
Number of  Share of 787  Share of debt  average debt owed
Resolution-path  firms  firms  (end-9  1)  owed  to main  to main bank
banks (end-91)  (end-91) --in bln zl
Repayment  / good  314  40%  30%  15.1
clients
Bank Conciliation  180  23%  46%  41.1
Court Conciliation  15  2%  1%  13.8
Sale of Debt  62  8%  7%  16.8
Liquidation  36  5%  2%  9.4
Bankruptcy  137  17%  10%  12.1
Other  43  5%  4%  13.8
Profitabili  and employment.  Figure 2 shows  the average  operating  profits in 1991  and
1992  and the average  number  of employees38  of the firms entering  different  resolution  paths.
These  two variables  are significant  explanatory  variables. 39 Firms entering  bank conciliation
were on average  fnore  profitable  in 1991-92  (with  average  operating  profits of 1  percent)  than
firms in other  paths. Those entering  liquidation  or bankruptcy  were the least  profitable,  with
average  operating  profits  of -47 and -45 percent,  respectively. Firms entering  bank conciliation
also had on average  more employees  (almost 1300  per firm)  than firms  in other  paths. Those
entering  bankruptcy  had the fewest  employees  (other  than the small number  of firms whose debt
was sold), but had still been quite large  in 1991/92,  with about 500 employees  on average. In
essence,  the bank conciliation  route captured  firms  that either  had reasonable  prospects  for
successful  workout  and/or were large enough  to make a political  impact. This result is
encouraging  and shows  that  the process  may have  roughly  succeeded  in separating  viable from
unviable  firms. 40
37 Our sample  intentionally  omitted  the biggest,  most  politicized  cases.
38 Size of debt  is to some extent  a proxy for  size of the firm  and it therefore  correlated  with number  of employees.
39 See Annex  2 for logistic  regression  results.
40 This  of course  assumes  some correlation  between  past profitability  and future  potential.
12Figure  2: Average  Operating  Profitability and Number  of Employees  1991  /1992|
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The causes of financial distress in the 62 enterprises entering the conciliation process
differed little from those in the other 77 enterprises in our sample. The most commonly cited
cause of financial distress-named  by almost 9 out of 10 firms in both groups as one of the 3
most important causes, and by almost one-half as the most important-was  declining domestic
consumption of the goods they produced. Indeed, total domestic consumption of the major
product of the 62 firms entering conciliation declined on average by 27 percent between 1989
and 1991. The second most commonly cited cause, which affected about one-half of all firms,
was an inability to collect receivables.  A decline in exports to CMEA markets affected about
one-third of the firms, and was cited as the most important cause by one-fifth.  One-quarter of the
firms blamed increased import competition. Imports of the respective major products of all 62
firms increased on average by 23 percent between 1989 and 1991, contributing to the decline in
their average market share from 64 to 57 percent over the same period.  Finally, 30 percent of the
firms noted rising tax burdens or increasing prices of inputs as important.  Our data indicate that
input prices for these firms rose on average 15 percent more than the sales price of their major
product.
These answers, and accompanying firm-level data that support them, indicate that many
of the firms in our sample were severely affected by the general downturn in the Polish economy
in 1990 and 1991, either suffering a decline in sales themselves or having customers unable to
pay their bills.  A smaller but still significant percentage were affected by structural changes
specifically attritable to transition-including  the realligmnent of prices, increasing import
competition, and declining CMEA exports.  While it is often hard to differentiate these two
factors-recession  vs. transition-related structural change-in  practice one might expect those
firms citing structural reasons for their financial distress to have a lower likelihood of eventual
recovery.  No significant differences in reasons for financial distress appear to exist, however,
between the firms in our sample that entered workout processes and those that were slated for
closure.
Structure of Enterprise Debt
The change from 1991 to 1994 in the structure of outstanding debt reported on firms'
balance sheets gives a rough snapshot of financial developments in our sample of firms. 4'
Although the nominal value of total reported debt rose substantially from 1991 to 1993, its real
value (after indexing for inflation) rose only slightly during that period, and it fell sharply in
1994 as a result of the conciliation process (Table 6). The balance sheet changed dramatially
over the period. As a share of total assets, total reported debt rose on average from 54 percent in
1991 to 101 percent in 1993, before falling back to 79 percent in 1994 (Figure 3).  Most of this
41 Several  words  of caution are in order concerning  this data, which  were taken  from the balance  sheets  of the
surveyed  firms. First, accrued  interest  on debt to suppliers  is not typically  included  in enterprise  accounts,  while
accrued interest  on debt to government  and ZUS is always  included  and that on debt to banks is sometimes
included. Second,  the 1994  figures  overstate  debt  burdens,  because  many write-offs  (particularly  of government
debt) were not reflected  immediately  in firms' balance  sheets.
14increase reflected a decline in the real value of assets, due both to shedding of assets and to
inadequate indexing for inflation. 42 With regard to the structure of reported debt, bank debt and
payables to suppliers fell significantly both in real terms and as a share of total debt (Table 7),
while government debt skyrocketed by both measures. Taxes and social insurance payables to the
government more than doubled in real terms from 1991 to 1993. As a share of total assets, they
increased from 7 percent in 1991 to 31 percent in 1993. In thirteen cases the government (the tax
office and ZUS) replaced banks or suppliers as the largest creditor (Table 8).  At least 70 percent
of these payables consisted of overdue tax and social insurance arrears. 43 It is interesting to note
that debt to workers (that is, wage arrears) were negligible throughout the period, in contrast to
the situation in distressed firms in the former Soviet Union.
Table 6: Average Debt per Firm to Various Creditors*
(billion 1991 PZL, indexed for inflation**)
1991  1992  1993  1994
Debt owed to:  (post-conciliation)
Banks  _  _42.5  34.7  25.9  13.2
Suppliers  40.6  35.8  36.5  22.9
Tax and ZUS  15.8  24.8  35.5  30.9
Other payables***  9.9  10.1  12.7  10.6
Other liabilities****  9.1  8.2  7.7  16.4
TOTAL  118.0  114.1  123.4  96.1
- N=62
**  Using the producer price index.
* **  Includes  in some cases accrued  interest  on overdue  debt; payables  to workers  are small  throughout  the period.
**** Includes  workers' capital, obligations  to housing  and other  funds, and some debt  write-offs  (particularly  of
government  debt)  in conciliation  agreements  that  remained  on the balance  sheet  to be slowly  written-off  as the
agreements  were implemented.
Revaluation  of assets  during  this period was allowed  several  times,  with  the extent  of revaluation  being largely  at
the discretion  of firm  management.
43 We do not know the exact breakdown  between  current  and overdue  payables  for all categories  of taxes  for all
years.  Of debts to the tax office  and the social  insurance  agency  at year-end  1993,  28 percent  of payables  were
current and 72 percent were overdue  (43 percent  for more  than one year). Because  payments  to ZUS  were in
general  more likely  to be made  than payments  to other  tax agencies, an estimate  of three-quarters  of tax liabilities  in
arrears appears  reasonable.
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Table  7: Debt to various  creditor  groups as a share  of total  debt*
1989  1991  1992  1993  1994
(post  conciliation)
Banks  26%  38%  31%  27%  15%
Suppliers  38%  35%  28%  26%  22%
Tax  21%  12%  19%  22%  23%
ZUS  3%  2%  6%  8%  10%
Other payables  12%  7%  10%  11%  12%
Other liabilities  N.A.  6%  6%  6%  16%
TOTAL  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
*N=48  in 1989,  N=62 in other  years; Note that these  proportions  differ from those implicit  in Table  6, because  in
this calculation  each finr is weighted  equally.
Table 8:  Identity of Largest Creditor (number of cases)
____  _ 1991  1993
Banks  31  21
Suppliers  27  18
Tax  3  15
zUS  0  1
IOther  1  7
16These trends support the findings of other studies44  that indicate that suppliers are among
the first creditors to begin imposing hard budget constraints on firms in transition.  As the
suppliers themselves are squeezed by market pressures and cutoffs in subsidies, they begin to
require payment in cash before they ship goods.  State-owned banks also tighten their lending
when subject to macroeconomic and market discipline.  The biggest remaining source of
"softness" in firms'  budget constraints during the early stages of reform is likely to be the
government, which has great technical and political difficulty collecting tax and social insurance
payments and thereby forcing financial discipline for problem firms. 45
The Conciliation Process in Action
Initiating Debt Collection
The EBRP was designed in large part to force large creditors to bear down on bad debtors
and attempt to collect their debts.  From our sample it is clear that creditors were indeed
relatively passive in the early years of reform, and that the EBRP was a catalyst for action.
Table 9 shows the average number of days between events (for those events completed by
mid-1995) for our sample of 62 firms in the bank conciliation process.  The base portfolio was
intended to include loans classified as doubtful or loss as of December 1991. Thus, we start our
timetable on September 30, 1991, approximately the date, on average, that banks should have
realized that a given loan was in trouble.
The first step noted on the timetable is the initiation of debt collection action.  The EBRP
was clearly an important catalyst for the banks.  Only 24 of the 62 firms in our sample were
subject to any debt collection whatsoever before they applied for bank conciliation.  Even for
those 24 firms, an average of about 15 months elapsed between when the loan should have been
recognized as bad and when the first debt collection action was taken.  In only eleven cases was
action taken before the passage of the law.  The conciliation procedure began on average ten
months after passage of the law and a full 800 days (over two years) after banks should have
known that the loans were in trouble.
What triggered the initiation of bank conciliation proceedings?  Table 10 shows the
answers that our sample enterprises gave to this question.  In very few cases was it aggressive
action by creditors to collect their money that triggered the specific timing of conciliation
discussions, although some form of creditor pressure may have figured prominently in up to one-
half of our cases.  In the other half it appears that enterprises sought bank conciliation agreements
"to obtain additional working capital" or "to obtain a debt write-offs' (the major subcategory of
"other").  Enterprises would not normally need additional working capital if their operating
profitability was satisfactory.  Therefore, it is safe to conclude that conciliation-from  the
44 World Bank (1996).
5  The decision which creditor to pay can be an important one in financially distressed companies, sometimes
handled exclusively by the Chief Executive.  A number of managers in the survey expressed personal gratitude to
the head of the local tax office, whithout whose help the enterprise would not have survived.
17enterprise's viewpoint-was  triggered more often by the desire of managers to continue covering
weak performance as by decisive actions by creditors to collect the money they were owed.
Table 9: Timetable for the Bank Conciliation Process (as of mid-1995)
Average  Coefficient  Maximum  Minimum  Number  of
number  of  of Variance  Cases
days
Sept.  30, 1991  until date offirst  679  34.6  1129  -117  62
debt collection action  (9 Aug. 93)  (2 Nov. 94)  (5 Jun. 91)
Sept. 30, 1991  until date of first  475  50.9  870  -117  24
debt collection  action (if another  (17 Jan. 93)  (6 Feb. 94)
occured  before  beginning  of BPU
procedure)
Sept. 30, 1991  until initiation  of  800  10.6  1129  634  61
bank conciliation proceedings  (8 Dec. 93)  (2 Nov. 94)  (25 Jun.  93)
Initiation  of conciliation  118  60.2  389  8  61
proceedings  to final vote on draft  (5 Apr. 94)
agreement
For state-owned  banks: In case  58  67.2  187  18  46
final vote took place before  April  (3 Mar. 94)  (25 Oct. 93)
30, 1994-how many days?
For state-owned  banks: In case  118  73.6  235  5  8
final vote took place after April  (26Aug. 94)  (21 Dec. 94)
30, 1994-how many  days?
In case of no appeal:  final vote to  49  54.4  143  0  36
date conciliation  agreement  took  (21 May
effect  94)46
In case of appeal: final vote to  124  83.7  431  0  23
date conciliation  agreement  took  (7 Aug. 94)46
effect
Overall length  of bank  198  49.5  529  45  59
conciliation  procedure: initiation
of conciliation  proceedings  to
date conciliation  agreement  took
effect
In case creditors' council already  119  48.5  324  15  40
met: Date of final vote to first
meeting  of creditor's council
In case of a debt-equity  swap:  298  54.9  731  94  14
Date  conciliation  agreement  took  (by mid-95)
effect to issuance  of shares
46  The  illustrative  average  dates  presented  here  rest  on  the  bold  assumption,  accepted  here  for  the  sake  of
illustration,  that  the  average  date  for  the  final  vote  on agreements  later  appealed  is the  same  as the  average  date  for
the  final  vote  on agreements  not appealed.
18Table 10: What Triggered  Bank  Conciliation?
(in percent of firms)
One of three
Most important  most important
reason  reasons
Attempts or threats by creditors to
foreclose on collateral  16  29
Inability of debtor to obtain additional  36  82
working capital
Pressure by founding organ to deal with  0  13
creditors
Threat by creditor to sell their debt  21  52
Other-'  27  47
Forming Creditor Groups
The rules for bank conciliation allowed creditors to be divided into different groups for
purposes of negotiating the conditions in the conciliation agreement.  Creditors in the same group
would receive the same treatment, and creditors in groups not including the main bank (generally
small creditors) could not receive worse treatment than creditors in the group with the main bank
(generally large creditors). In this way, creditors-particularly  small creditors-were  protected
from being disadvantaged by other creditors-particularly  the bank leading the negotiations.
Another protection was included in the rules to prevent the lead bank from protecting its interests
at the expense of other creditors:  Each bank was charged with monitoring the implementation of
the conciliation agreements it led, and was responsible to other creditors if agreements'
conditions were not fulfilled by the debtors.
Because of these nondiscrimination requirements, it was clearly in the interests of the
main bank to differentiate as little as possible among creditors, that is, to include as many
creditors as possible in the same group. However, to obtain a 50 percent voting majority and to
reduce the likelihood of appeals brought by disgruntled creditors, it might still be necessary to
provide better treatment for some creditors-particularly  small ones whose full payback would
not "cost" too much for other creditors.  Indeed, analysis of our sample confirms that these
incentives were prominent.  In 53 of the 62 cases different creditor groups were formed, while in
nine cases48  all creditors were grouped together.  Where different groups were formed, the
second group (that is, the one not including the lead bank) contained only creditors holding small
47 Because  "other"  was such a high  percentage,  we analysed  these answers  in detail. Half  of the answers  listed
under "other"  point out that the BPU procedure  gave a possibility  of obtaining  a reduction  in debt, another  group  of
answers  indicate  increased  pressure  from creditors  (37 percent of "other"),  while the rest is difficult  to categorize.
48 Of the nine cases with  only one creditor  group,  eight were from the stronger  banks.
19claims. 49 The first group tended to have quite a large number of creditors (on average 57) and
held the overwhelming majority (on average 87 percent) of the debt subject to conciliation.  The
small creditors, even though there were many (on average 95) held relatively little debt and thus
could be given better treatment without severely damaging the larger creditors.
Negotiating and Monitoring Agreements
Once begun, the conciliation process could last as long as a year or could be completed
within the course of a week.  On average it took four months, although in many cases the
agreement had in effect been negotiated before the process officially began. 50 In the case of the
seven state-owned banks, fifteen percent of the agreements in our sample were concluded after
the deadline of April 30, 1994 imposed by the Ministry of Finance. 5' Nevertheless, the existence
of a deadline was very important as a spur to banks to finish the process (Figure 4).
Figure  4: Timing  of Conclusion  of Conciliation  Agreements
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49  In 51 of the 53 cases, the groups were distinguished by the size of debt that the creditor was holding.  In 46 of
these two groups were formed, large and small creditors, the cut-off between the two being anywhere between
PZL5 million (US$238) and PZL5 billion (US$238,000).  The average cut off between the two groups in our
sample was roughly PZL255 mln (US$12,140).  In the 5 cases where three groups were formed, the average cut-off
between "medium" and "small" creditors was also at that mark.  In the other 2 cases, the groups were distinguished
by type of creditors, which is in fact highly correlated with size of debt (because trade creditors tend to have smaller
debt claims than banks).
50  There does not seem to be a clear correlation between length of the process and the size or number of creditors
of the firm.  The process does appear to have gone somewhat faster for firms with higher debt burdens (debt/asset
ratios), perhaps because more attention was paid to those cases.
51  Initially, the deadline was March 31, 1994, but was subsequently moved by one month to April 30, 1994.
20Even though smaller creditors were legally entitled to equal or better treatment, they
tended to be less inclined to approve conciliation agreements.  The majority of large creditors
favored the agreement in 85 percent of cases, 52 while the majority of small creditors favored the
agreement in only 38 percent of cases (even though they received much more preferable
treatment).
The EBRP law provided that a conciliation agreement should take effect within 30 days
of the its signing.  In practice agreements that were not appealed took effect on average 49 days
after the final vote. 53 About 40 percent of the agreements in our sample were appealed, over four-
fifths of the time by a supplier. But not a single conciliation agreement was nullified or modified
by a court.  Twenty-three appeals were rejected, and one was still pending as of mid-1995.  If
there was an appeal, the duration of the overall procedure lengthened considerably, but even
agreements that were appealed came into effect on average three months after signing.
A creditors'  council was formed in most cases (51 out of 62) to monitor the agreements,
but its importance 54 appears to have been small. In eleven cases, the creditors' council had not
even met once when the company was interviewed in the summer of 1995, although the
agreement had on average been signed for more than a year. 55 In the other cases, the period from
the date the conciliation agreement took effect until the creditors' council first met was on
average about 4 months, and in some cases up to 11 months.
Rather than a group of creditors, our data indicate that the lead bank was generally in
control of the bank conciliation process (see Figure 5).  The top management of the creditor was
also actively involved. Nonmanagerial employees in the firm were much less involved, despite
the traditional role of labor in management of Poland's state-owned firms.  Creditors other than
the lead bank were generally passive, although among these other creditors the tax and social
insurance authorities appear to be somewhat more involved than trade creditors or other bank
creditors.  Although this general pattern is not uncommon in workout processes in advanced
market economies, the passivity of creditors is more marked in transition settings.  Such
passivity potentially compromises the effectiveness and fairness of workout processes.
52  In all but one of the cases approved  by large  creditors,  their vote alone  was sufficient  to carry  the total vote over
the required  50  percent threshold.
53 A "waiting"  period  of one-month  was provided  in the law to allow time  for appeals. The 49 days in practice
reflected  delays  by the Ministry  of Privatisation,  which  had to approve  all agreements.
The functions  of the creditor  council  provided  for by the EBRP  law  and those of a creditor  council  in western
economies  are somewhat  different. In the EBRP  the creditor  council serves  primarily  to monitor  the bank
conciliation  agreement  once it is concluded.
55 Average  452 days,  maximum  613  days, minimum  291 days, standard  deviation  91-quite  a flat distribution.
21Figure 5: Average Involvement of Various Creditor Groups
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Outcomes of Bank Conciliation to Date
The most important question surrounding the bank conciliation process, and the EBRP
more generally, is its impact on enterprise restructuring.  Did the process allow viable firms to
survive that might otherwise be forced to close?  Did it lead firms to improve their efficiency?
Did it result in changes in ownership or management?  While our data do not provide answers to
all of these questions-indeed,  perhaps insufficient time has passed to allow definitive answers
to be drawn-it  offers interesting clues on the likely impact of the process.
Financial Restructuring
The Law of February 3, 1993, allowed debtors and creditors to use a wide variety of
techniques to adjust debt obligations and reduce debt service burdens.  They could write off (in
full or in part) principal and/or accumulated interest, extend due dates or payment periods, reduce
the interest rate charged on outstanding loans, increase the collateral attached to loans, or swap
debt for equity. Finally, banks were allowed to extend additional credit as part of the
restructuring agreement.
Our survey indicates that the two universal provisions in conciliation agreements were
debt write-offs and extensions in the payment period (Table 11 and Annex 3).  It also shows that
the second category of creditors, typically small creditors, received much more favorable
treatment than the first category.  For the 53 cases with two classes of creditors, large creditors
wrote off 54 percent of the debt owed to them on average, while small creditors wrote off only
four percent. For the nine cases with only one class of creditor, the average write-off was 66
percent.  The maximum write-off for large creditors was 89 percent.  In no case was there no
write-off of debt.
22Table 11: Financial  Conditions  in Conciliation  Agreements
Weak banks  Strong  banks  All banks
(N = 26)  (N = 36)  (N = 62)
% of debt in  % of debt in  % of debt in
Condition  #of  conciliation  #of  conciliation  #of  conciliation
cases  in those  cases  in those  cases  in those
cases  cases  cases
Write-off
-large creditors  25  53%  28  55%  53  54%
-small creditors  25  5%  28  4%  53  4%
-one category  1  80%  8  65%  9  66%
Immediate partial
repayment
-large creditors  0  0  0  0  0  0
-small creditors  2  1%  4  .5%  6  .6%
-one category  0  0  0  0  0  0
Debt-equity swap
-large creditors  18  30%  6  36%  24  32%
-small creditors  0  0  0  0  0  0
-one category  0  0  1  37%  1  37%
New equity  1  .1%  1  11%  2  6%
Newbankcredit  9  9%  10  10%  19  10%
Banks had consistently been capitalizing interest not paid in the past, while other
creditors had not. Because equal treatment was by law required for all creditors, there tended to
be greater percentage write-offs of accrued interest than of principal. 56 Other than this, our
analysis could find no significant relationships between the size of the write-off given to
individual firms and any other variables-whether  the extent of firm indebtedness, the size of the
firm, the profitability of the firm, the date negotiations on the agreement began or ended, or the
identity of the bank.
A renegotiation of the maturity of the remaining loans was of course necessary in
virtually all cases.  The new maturity structures were also more favorable for small creditors.  On
average the first payment was due to them 107 days after the agreement took effect, and the last
payment was due 241 days later.  In contrast, the first payment was not due to large creditors
until 205 days after the agreement took effect, and the last payment was not due until 894 days
later.  In other words, small creditors could on average expect to have their loans entirely repaid
within a year, while on average large creditors had to wait until early 1995 for their first
56 Approximately  44 percent  of the total  debt subject  to conciliation  agreements  was accrued interest.
23payment, and can expect to see the final payment during the summer of 1997.57 Clearly the large
creditors, led by the main bank, took the brunt of the financial burden for these agreements.
While nondiscrimination against small creditors was written into the design of the process, this
extent of preference to small creditors was perhaps not anticipated.
Other financial restructuring tools were less common.  Immediate partial payback of
outstanding debt was required in only 6 cases, and even in these cases the amount was
miniscule-on  average less than 1 percent of outstanding claims.  In only 2 cases did creditors
move to increase their collateral, which may be in part explained by the weakness of collateral
58 systems in Poland.  Finally, our survey saw no evidence of any reduction in interest rates.
Rather than adjust interest rates on outstanding balances, the agreements essentially pooled all
remaining principal and accrued interest obligations (after write-offs), and assigned schedules for
their repayment-without  additional interest.
The design of the EBRP was to a large extent predicated on the hope that debt would be
swapped for equity on a large scale, and thus the process would result in a change in ownership
(and privatization once the banks were themselves privatized) as well as furthering enterprise
restructuring. In practice, debt-equity swaps occurred in 25 of our 62 cases and covered on
average 33 percent of the debt in those cases.  The swaps involved almost exclusively large
creditors; small creditors took equity in only one case--where all creditors were classified in only
one group.
It is interesting to note that the weakest banks (as defined earlier for Table 3) were the
most active in swapping debt for equity, while they more or less matched the stronger banks in
the amount of loans they agreed to write off (Table 11). Other research has indicated that Polish
banks are in general not eager to own equity because of the extra risks and monitoring burdens
associated with it.3 9 Our sample provides additional evidence that the stronger banks were indeed
more cautious.  The fact that weaker banks were the primary ones to use this restructuring tool
may reflect the fact that they had worse clients and fewer options.  But even so it does not augur
particularly well for the central role originally envisioned for debt-equity swaps in the workout
process.
Because debt-equity swaps were limited, and because the provision of the law regarding
60 the forced debt-equity conversion did not work,  the privatization goals of the program were not
57 Under  the law,  banks  are responsible  for debtors' fulfillment  of the terms  of conciliation  agreements  after the
agreement  is in force  for three years. This  provision  led in many cases to an artificial  shortening  of pay-back
periods.
58 For further  discussion  of Poland's collateral  system,  see Baer  and Gray (1996).
59 Dittus  and Prowse  (1996).
60  To facilitate  privatization,  the law allowed  any creditor  with  at least  30 percent  of the debt of a firm in default  to
apply to the Ministry  of Privatisation  for a debt-equity  swap  (preceded  by compulsory  commercialization),  even
outside  the bank conciliation  procedure.  The swap  was supposed  to be approved  by the Ministry  within  30 days.
That provision  of the law was  not used in practice,  mainly  because  it was blocked  by the Ministry  of Privatisation.
24met.  The Polish government originally set minimum targets whereby conciliation agreements
would result in a reduction in government ownership to below 50 percent of shares in at least 30
percent of all cases.61 The average expected post-swap pattern of enterprise ownership for the 25
cases with debt-equity swaps is shown in Table 12. The government retains on average a 47
percent stake; it keeps an absolute majority in twelve cases.  When added to the 37 cases that did
not feature a debt-equity swap, the government maintains majority ownership in 49 cases, or 79
percent of the 62 firms in the sample.  The main bank obtains a majority stake in only one case,
and in twelve cases no one party obtains a majority, although banks, suppliers, managers and
employees together have a majority.  At best one could argue that the conciliation process will
eventually result in privatization of 13 of the 62 firms in our sample, or 21 percent, once the
banks and and state-owned suppliers are themselves privatized.
Table 12: Expected ownership structure in 25 cases with debt-equity swaps
Average share of  Average post-  Maximum post-
debt, end-1993  swap equity stake  swap equity stake
Government  23%  47%  100%
Bank(s)  29%  23%  58%
Suppliers  26%  20%  55%
Managers / Employees  1%  6%  37%
Other  21%  4%  36%
Finally, new loans were-perhaps  not surprisingly-relatively  uncommon.  The two
privatized banks did not give new money in any of the cases in our sample.  The state-owned
banks gave new loans in 19 cases and new equity in two cases. The new loans equalled on
average 10 percent of the outstanding debt covered by the conciliation process.
It is interesting to note that ZUS, although not a party to these agreements, did negotiate
separate agreements with 50 of the 62 firms in our sample.  The debt covered by these
agreements with ZUS was on average one-fifth as large as the debt covered by the conciliation
agreements.  On average the ZUS agreement was concluded 24 days after the conciliation
agreement was signed.  This average masks wide variability, with some ZUS agreements being
finalized more than one year either before or after the conciliation agreement.  In contrast to
other creditors, ZUS did not agree to any write-offs in 1994, but only to reschedulings of debt.
Renegotiated payback periods were quite tight, beginning on average 2 1/2 months after signing
and ending on average 23 months later.  Some immediate repayment was required in 13 of the
50 cases, but in all 13 cases the amount was very small (generally less than one percent of the
debt).
Commercialization
According to the Law of February 3, 1993, application for a bank conciliation procedure
61 World  Bank (1993) and annex 2: "Letter  of Development  Policy"  from the Polish  Government
25by a state-owned  enterprise  was equivalent  to consent  by its governing  bodies62  to be
commercialized,  i.e. transformed  into a joint-stock  company,  100  percent  owned  by the Treasury
and represented  by the Ministry  of Privatisation.63  The donor-community  believed  that "...[The]
program ... seeks  the commercialization  ... of virtually  all troubled  SOEs"64  because  the
"Government  [of Poland]  has ...  agreed  to minimum  targets  whereby  conciliation  agreements
would  result, in at least ...70 percent of the cases  in ... commercialization" 65. If our sample  is
representative,  this objective  was fulfilled  (see Table 13),  assuming  one includes  those
companies  commercialized  before  the law was passed in 1993  or long after all agreements  took
effect  (i.e. in 1995  and 1996)  as "commercialized  as a result of the program".
Table 13: Year  of Commercialization*
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Total  Not transformed
3  10  2  23  7  1  46  15
(75%)  (25%)
*61 enterprises;  one firm was already  a limited  liability  company.
Commercialization  occurred  in 46 of our 62 cases. Fifteen  companies  were transformed
before signing a bank conciliation  agreement  (including  those already  commercialized  before
conciliation  began); 31 companies  were transformed  after going  through  the process. On
average,  these 31 enterprises  were transformed  into 100  percent  state-owned  joint stock
companies  200 days after  the final  vote on the agreement,  despite  the stipulation  in the law that
transformation  has to occur  within 30 days.66  No transformation  had occured in 15 firms by the
summer  of 1996  (including  three cases  with debt-equity  swaps). It is unclear why some  firms in
bank conciliation  escaped commercialization  given  the automatic  consent  implied  by the
application  process.
Restrucjng  lan
Firms entering  into bank conciliation  were supposed  to present  restructuring  plans, and of
our 62 sample  firms, 52 presented  plans  that were still accessible  when the survey  was
62 These  included  the management  and the worker's council.
63 At year-end  1991,  54 of 62 firms  that would  later  enter  bank conciliation  in our  sample  were  state  enterprises.
Four were already commercialized  joint stock companies,  two  were fully owned  by another  state enterprise,  and two
were partially  privatized  (with a majority  stake  still in state  hands).
64 World Bank (1993),  p. 30
65 World Bank (1993),  p. 31 and annex  2: "Letter  of Development  Policy"  from the Polish  Government,  p. 60. The
latter  mentions  75 percent as a goal.
66 The standard  deviation  was 78, indicating  quite a wide distribution  of answers.  The quickest  registration  in the
sample  occured  36 days after  the final  vote, while one  company  was converted  only  after 387 days-a  year more
than required  by the law.
26undertaken.67  But the contents  of many of these plans  were vague or unrealistic,  based  more on
hopes than on actual analysis. On the financial  side, most of the plans  were optimistic. Forty-
eight forecast  profits in 1994  and 51 in 1995. The plans  generally  contained  little detail on
operational  restructuring,  with half or fewer committing  to specific  changes  such as sales of
assets (ten firms) or changes  in staffing  levels (28 firms). Five plans included  sales of parts of
the firm as a going  concern.  The plans  that projected  employment  levels expected  the average
number  of employees  to grow. No management  changes  were envisaged  in any restructuring
plan.
The conclusion  that the plans  were more fantasy  than fact is evidenced  by a comparison
of actual  performance  with planned  performance.  Table 14 shows  actual and projected  operating
profits-that  is, operating  earnings  before interest  and taxes (EBIT)68  as a share  of operating
revenues-for  1994  and 1995  for the 40 cases in which  detailed  financial  plans were presented
for both years.  Because in almost  all cases 1994  was the first year of implementation,  one would
expect  the plans  to be reasonably  accurate. However,  the plans projected  an average  operating
profit of 9.0 percent,  while the firms  realized  an average  operating  profit of less than 1 percent. 69
When divided  between strong  and weak  banks,  the average  difference  between  plan and actual
was 4.4 percent for the former,  compared  with 13.2  percent for the latter. 70 Differences  between
plan and actual  were even larger in 1995,  with the divergences  being again more marked  in the
case  of weaker  banks.
Table 14: Actual  vs. Planned  Operating  Profits,  1994 (40 firms)
(in percent,  standard  deviation  in parenthesis)
Average  actual  Average  planned  Average  difference
X___________  operating  profit  operating  profit  (planned  minus actual)
____________  1994  1995  1994  1995  1994  1995
All banks  0.4  -3.1  9.0  12.0  8.8  15.0
(40 cases)  (11)  (23)  (9)  (8)  (13)  (25)
Strong  banks  3.8  0.3  8.0  11.5  4.4  11.0
(20 cases)  (9)  (10)  (10)  (8)  (12)  (11)
Weak banks  -3.0  -6.4  10.2  12.0  13.2  18.0
(20 cases)  (12)  (31)  (8)  (9)  (13)  (34)
67 Sixteen  percent  of the ftrms surveyed  were not able to find a copy of any restructuring  plan. Such a plan was
required  under the law.
68  In Polish  terminology,  operating  profits as we use  them here equal  "operating  revenues"  plus "revenues  from the
sale of products  not produced  inside  the company"  minus  "costs  of products  produced  inside  the company  and sold
during  the period"  minus  "costs  of purchase  of products  not produced  inside  the company  but sold during  the
period". There is no addition  of income  from stocks  nor deduction  for interest  payments.
69 If one adds depreciation  back in, operating  profit  becomes  operating  cash  flow. The average  difference  between
actual  and projected  operating  cash  flow was also  9 percent.
70 Statistical  analysis  confirmed  the lack of any significant  correllation  between  planned  and actual operating
profits  as well as the fact  that the difference  between  these  two figures  was significantly  higher for weak banks  than
for strong  banks. (See  Annex 4 for scattergram  of individual  answers).
27With regard  to actual  performance,  the financial  operating  performance  of most of the 62
firms  in our sample  has deteriorated  rather  than improved  since the conciliation  agreements  were
concluded. Average  operating  profit for the 57 firms in our sample  with data throughout  the
period  was 4 percent in 1991. It fell to -3.5 percent  in 1992,  rose back  to 0 percent  in 1993,  fell
slightly  to -I percent  in 1994,  and fell further  to -3 percent  in 1995.  Operating  profits  in market
economies  are generally  on the order  of 5 to 13  percent. The number  of firms  in our sample with
operating  profits over 5 percent fell consistently  over the period (Table 15). This operating
performance  is not irnpressive,  especially  given  the robust  growth  in the Polish economy  of over
six percent per year in both 1994  and 1995.
Before-tax  ("gross")  and after-tax  ("net") profit figures  reported  by firms  in 1994  were
much higher than these figures  for operating  profit and seem to show  major improvements  in
financial  performance. But all suffer from a major distortion:  the firms booked  debt write-offs  as
profits. This raised 1994  gross  and net profit figures  (over 1993  amounts)  by 40 to 50 percent of
total revenue on average,  as shown in Figure  6, and put them at over 10 percentage  points above
operating  profits.
Figure 6: Profit Measures  for Firms in Bank Conciliation
(57 firms)
20%
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  199  19  92  /  1993  199  1995
to0%  1  7  11  16  16
40%//,rb
5%to0  5  7  5  10  8
Less than5%  10  23  19  15  19
Total  57  57  57  57  57
28The fact that operating  profit  hardly changed  in 1994  and 1995  is explained  by the
behavior  of operating  revenues  (Figure  7) and operating  costs (Figure  8). These  figures show
average  changes  in the level and structure  of revenues  and costs in 54 firms (i.e. those with
adequate  data) from 1991  to 1995,  using 1991  as an index  and giving  each firm an equal weight.
Both revenues  and costs  rose slightly  from 1993  to 1994  and much more from 1994  to 1995.
However,  the patterns of change  give little evidence  of significant  restructuring  in 1994. On the
revenue  side, domestic sales increased  significantly,  as would  be expected  given  the strong
recovery  in the Polish economy  in 1994  and 1995,  but exports  increased  only slightly.  On the
cost side, costs for energy  and materials  rose in both 1994  and 1995-probably in part a
reflection  of increases  in regulated  energy  prices. Other  costs stayed roughly  level, with a slight
fall in depreciation  expense  being compensated  by a slight  rise in other  costs.
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Financial performance is only one measure of restructuring.  Employment and wages is
another. Our sample of 62 firms had been reducing employment about 10 percent per year on
average from 1990 to 1993. In both 1994 and 1995 the layoff rate slowed to about one-half that
level.  The average wage rose roughly in line with inflation in 1994 and rose even faster -- by 18
percent in real terms -- in 1995. It had fallen by over 10 percent in real terms between 1991 and
1993.  As seen in Figure 8, the wage bill and wage-related costs declined steadily from 1991 to
1993 but stayed level in 1994 and rose in 1995. These trends are difficult to interpret in the
abstract.  They could indicate that conciliation agreements provided "breathing room" that
allowed firms to slow down painful restructuring.  Alternatively, they could signal that staffing
levels and wages had already been reduced sufficiently.  The former is arguably the more likely
explanation, given the weak operating profits of these firms in 1994 and 1995. With regard to
other indicators, numerous firms reported some changes in the membership of management
boards, some discontinuation of unprofitable products, and some sale or leasing of assets, but in
no case did these indicators alter significantly in 1994 from what they had consistently been in
1992 and 1993. In sum, our data did not provide evidence of a significant change in either the
methods or the rate of firm restructuring in 1994 as compared to earlier years, and financial
performance in most firms in our sample appears to have stayed even or weakened rather than
improved since the conciliation agreements were signed.
Conclusions
Poland has since 1992 been considered a model of commercial banking reform among
transition countries. Its Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program, adopted by parliament in
early 1993, aimed to build institutional capacity in state-owned commercial banks and to take
concrete steps to resolve their problem loans, through either workouts, liquidation processes, or
loan sales.  This paper has reviewed in detail the process and initial impact of Poland's  bank-led
30workout ("conciliation")  process  in a sample  of 62 enterprises  (part of a larger sample  we have
studied  of 139 firms  following  one of the five paths of loan  resolution  under  the EBRP).
How effective  has the conciliation  process  been? Although  any assessment  at this stage
is still somewhat  preliminary,  experience  to date suggests  some  outcomes. First, many aspects  of
the EBRP in general and the conciliation  process in particular  appear  quite positive. 71 The
reform  program  was clearly  innovative  and well-designed.  In general  banks and enterprises  took
it seriously,  and it appears  to have  been free of fraud  or corruption.  Compliance  with its
prescriptions  has been high but not perfect. For example,  both the 1992  government  stance  and
the 1993  law required  that banks stop new lending  (including  rollovers  of previous  loans) to
firms with debts already  classified  as either  doubtful  or loss in audits  by international  accounting
firms. Yet about one-eighth  of the firms in our sample  appear  to have received  new loans  or
rollovers,  contrary to these directives. The law also envisioned  that enterprises  would  be
"commercialized",  that is, transformned  into  joint stock companies,  as part of the conciliation
process. Seventy-five  percent of the firms  in our sample  were transformed,  but the remainder
were not.
The EBRP  was clearly  very useful as a catalyst  in forcing  otherwise  passive creditors  to
take action against  bad debtors. Although  the debts  in question  turned bad in 1991,  creditors
took no action at all in over 80 percent of our 62 conciliation  cases  until the law was passed in
early 1993.  Even after the law was adopted,  in over 60 percent  of cases  nothing  happened  until
bank conciliation  was initiated,  on average  10  months afterwards.  By then the debt had been in
arrears  well over two years. The signing  dates of most agreements  cluster  closely  around March,
1994,  the original  deadline  under the law.
Not only was the law an important  catalyst,  but the process  was reasonably  rapid once
begun. On average  the conciliation  process  took between  six and seven  months from the date it
was initiated  until the date it finally  took effect.  Creditors  reached  agreement  on restructuring
plans quite quickly-in  about four months  on average. After agreement  was reached,  it generally
took somewhat  longer  than the law anticipated  to actually  take effect. But major slowdowns
occurred  only in cases of debt-equity  swaps;  for the 14  cases in which  swaps had been completed
by mid-1995,  it took some 10 months on average  for shares  to be issued  after swaps  were agreed
to, largely  because  of delays by the Ministry  of Privatization  in giving approval. For the other
cases it took even longer.
Finally,  the division  of firms  among  resolution  paths  appears  to have followed  economic
logic. Better  off firms  tended  to enter  conciliation,  while weaker  performers  tended to go into
bankruptcy  or liquidation.  Profitability  was not all that mattered,  however. Size also appears  to
have been important,  with larger firms  tending  to enter conciliation  regardless  of profitability.
This is not surprising;  these firms are politically  more  difficult  to close.
Despite  these strengths,  the data suggest  that the conciliation  process  may have had
71 But large segments  of the financial  system,  representing  well over  one-half  of the total  bad debts in  the banking
system,  were not covered  by the progran and were in even  worse shape.
31limited  power  to promote needed  restructuring  in firms. The agreements  themselves  were
relatively  unsophisticated,  perhaps  one reason  they  could be concluded  so rapidly. They dealt
primarily  with financial  conditions-mostly large debt  write-offs  and renegotiation  of payment
dates-and  included  very few tangible  requirements  for operational  or management  change.
Only weaker  banks were willing  to undertake  significant  debt-equity  swaps;  the stronger  banks
undertook  very few. To the extent  that restructuring  plans  were actually  prepared  for firms, they
appear  to have greatly overestimated  future  profitability,  particularly  when the weaker  banks (the
three banks to be consolidated  with Pekao  S.A.)  were in the lead.
Given  these features,  it is perhaps  not surprising  that the agreements  appear  to have
resulted  in little restructuring  to date.  The first two years of the agreements'  implementation  saw
a slowdown  in the rate of layoffs  from previous  years,  an increase  in the average  wage  rate (after
adjusting  for inflation),  and a decline  in average  operating  profitability  and cash flow. (Reported
net profits soared,  but this was because loan  write-offs  were booked as income.) The main
impact  of the conciliation  process  was probably  to provide  firms  with "breathing  room".  The
weak operating  performance  in 1994  and 1995  suggests  that many firms  continued  to have
problems  and that financial  discipline  was perhaps  still somewhat  "soft". Indeed,  the practice of
firms  booking  write-offs  as profit may have  given a misleading  impression  of higher post-
conciliation  profitability-and may possibly  lead to further  pressure for wage increases  or more
debt forgiveness  in the future.
Debt-equity  swaps  were not used as widely  as originally  hoped, and the conciliation
process  did not lead to extensive  ownership  change. Of the 62 state-owned  enterprises  in our
sample,  majority  stakes in at most one-fifth  will eventually  be in private  hands as a result of the
process,  if the banks themselves  are privatized. The fact  that most debt-equity  swaps  were
concluded  by the weaker  banks (i.e. those  last to be privatized)-and that the equity  also went
proportionately  to other, often  passive,  creditors  (including  government)-heightens the concern
that it may be a long time before  these swaps  translate  into effective  private ownership  and
governance.
Initial evidence  therefore  suggests  that the outcome  of Poland's first experiment  with
bank-led  workouts  is decidedly  mixed. The conciliation  process  forced  banks to confront  their
problems,  helped  them build institutional  capacity  in their workout  units (though  not necessarily
in their credit  units), and furthered  the difficult  task of weeding  out and closing  clearly  unviable
firms. Loans  could be written  down  without  creating  an environment  of general  debt
forgiveness. These are important  achievements  in transition,  and the Polish  approach  serves  in
many ways  as a model  for other transition  economies. The process  does  not, however,  seem  to
have rapidly  imposed  strong  restructuring  mandates  on problem  debtors,  and its success  in
privatizing  them has been limited. The EBRP  was a good start, but continued  work  is needed to
build strong  banks that can impose  effective  corporate  governance  on enterprises  in times of
financial  distress.
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34Annex 1:  Data used for bank categorization
Underlying  data:
Category  Equity  as a  Change  in equity  Bad loans as a  Change in bad
share  of risk-  as a share  of risk-  share  of loan  loans  as a share
weighted  weighted  assets  portfolio  of loan portfolio
assets, 199372  1991  to 1993  1991  1991  to 1993
Bank  I  weak  -1.2%  -14,0%  31%  +13%
Bank  2  weak  -4.4%  -3.2%  high  large increase
Bank  3  weak/adequate  -6.6%  +2.6%  60%  -38%
Bank 4  adequate/strong  8.5%  +5.1%  41%*  -4%*
Bank  5  strong  21.2%  +17.9%  41%  -13%
Bank 6  strong  strong  privatized  low  privatized
Bank  7  strong  6.6%  +8.3%  28%  -10%
Bank 8  strong  10%**  strongly  positive  28%  -3%
Bank 9  strong  strong  privatized  17%  privatized
* Data  not available  for 1991;  1992  data used instead.
**Data  not available  for 1993; 1992  data used instead
Rankings:
Category  Equity  as a  Change  in  Bad loans as  Change  in bad  Total
share of risk-  equity  as a  a share of  loans as a share
weighted  share  of risk-  loan  portfolio  of loan
assets,  weighted  assets  1991  75  portfolio
199373  1991  to 1993  74  1991  to 199376
Bank I  weak  1  1  2  1  5
Bank  2  weak  1  1  I  1  4
Bank 3  weak/  1  2  1  3  7
|  adequate |_  _  _
Bank 4  adequate/  3  3  1  2  9
strong
Bank  5  strong  3  3  1  3  10
Bank 6  strong  3  3  3  3  12
Bank 7  strong  3  3  2  3  11
Bank  8  strong  3  3  2  2  10
Bank 9  strong  3  3  3  3  12
72 Excluding  recapitalization  bonds  received  at  the  end  of 1993.
73 Negative  = 1;  Positive  up to 10%  = 2; Positive  of 10%  or more  = 3.
74 Decrease  = I;  Increase  up to 5% = 2;  Increase  above  5% = 3.
5 Over  40%  = 1; 20-40%  = 2;  Below  20%  = 3.
76 Increase  = ];  Decrease  upto 10%  =2;  Decrease  of 10%orabove=  3.
35Annex 2: Logistic  Regression  Results
A logistic regression  was run to test the significance  of operating  profitability  and number
of employees  in explaining  the resolution  paths  taken by the 139  firms  in our sample. The
coefficients  and their chi-square  values are indicated  below.  The positive  coefficients  for
operating  profit and number  of employees  for paths 1  and 2 indicate  that firms  with higher
operating  profits or more employees  are clearly  more likely  to repay or enter bank conciliation
than to "exit" via bankruptcy  or state enterprise  liquidation. The high chi-square  values and low
P-values  confirm  that these two variables  are highly significant. The chi-square  and P values for
path 3 are lower,  indicating  that there is not a highly significant  difference  between  the firms  that
enter  court conciliation  and  those that exit. (The coefficient  for operating  profit  has a P-value
just over 10  percent,  however,  making it marginally  significant.)
Resolution Path:Values relative to bankruptcy/liquidation
(chi-square, P-values in parentheses)
I1:  2:  3:
Repayment/  Bank  Court
good clients  conciliation  conciliation
(relative  to 1)  (relative  to 1)  (relative  to 1)
Intercept  -.77*  .05  -1.49*  *
(2.86, .091)  (.02, .895)  (6.08, .014)
Operating  profit  5.75**  6.33**  2.95
(EBIT)  (10.81, .001)  (19.83,  .000)  (2.70, .101)
Number  of employees  .001*  .001**  .001
1992  (3.72, .054)  (6.55, .011)  (1.20, .273)
*  P-value  less than 10 percent.
**P-value  less than 2 percent.
36ANNEX 3:
BANK CONCILIATION PROCEDURE: CONTENTS  OF AGREEMENT
WEAK  BANKS  STRONG  BANKS  ALL BANKS
Mean  S.D.  Max.  Min.  Numbe  Mean  S.D.  Max.  Min.  Numbe  Mean  S.D.  lax.  oin.  Numbe
as a % of totbl  nount in conciliation  of casee  as  a % of toal amount In concillation  of cases  as a % of tota  ount In conctatton  Of  C4aa
Writeoff  (principal  and Intorest)
LargeCredit  53%  21  89%  11%  25  55%  19  82%  11%  28  54%  20  89%  11%  53
Smal Credno  5%  8  38%  0%  25  4%  8  38%  0%  28  4%  8  38%  0%  53
n  ctegory only  80%  0  80%  80%  1  65%  25  82%  6%  8  66%  24  62%  6%  S
Inuodiate  partal  repaymwnt to
Lage Creditor  in no  case  8  hi no  ce  28  hI  no eas  44
SmaICredir  1%  1.15  2%  0%  2of25  0.50%  0.80  2.00%  0.04%  4o0uto28  0.81%  0.82  1.69%  0.02%  8dS3
One  catey  only  hi no cae  hI no  case  hk  no case
Maturity  of debt;  time bween  date  Mean  S.D.  Max.  Min.  Numu  Mean  S.D.  Max.  MIn.  Numbe  Mean  S.D.  Mlax.  iin.  N
conciliation  agreeent  took  effect  and:  In days  of case  In days  of case  In days  of c
(fortLag  Crodix)  Firstpeymentdue  276  176  631  29  18  190  125  379  13  25  205  181  502  -193  41
Lastpaymentdue  1052  395  1760  61  18  1218  269  1908  827  25  1099  317  1908  61  40
(forSmog  Cditom)  Fkstpsyment  du  166  108  410  2  25  66  56  186  -63  26  107  105  410  -193  48
Last payment  due  447  325  1096  77  25  253  365  1291  0  27  348  353  1291  13  48
(Onecategoryonty)  Fihtpsymwntdue  446  0  446  448  1  153  102  317  2  6  203  142  448  2  7
Lastpaymentdue  1177  0  1177  1177  1  1295  232  1738  1136  6  1286  211  1738  1144  7
Mean  S.D.  Mnx.  Sin.  Numbe  Mean  S.D.  Max.  Min.  Mumn  Mean  S.D.  Max.  oin.  N  _
- a % of totalmount  In conciliation  of casee  as  a %  of total amount In conciliation  of case  asa % of total  arount  In concillatkon  ofCe
Convemlon  of debt to equity
La  Creditors  30%  16.64  66%  9%  18  38%  21  56%  1.3%  6  32%  17.4  66%  1.3%  24
SnuM  Crdiors  in no  case  in no  ca  hi  no cae
t  categoryyonly  in no cae  37%  0  37%  37%  1  37%  0  37%  37%  1
New equity  0.1%  0.00  0.1%  0.1%  1  11%  0  11%  11%  1  6%  7.5  11%  1%  2
Now  reidt  from  bank  9%  8.66  30%  2%  9  10%  8.8  22%  3%  10  10%  8.8  30%  2%  190O  54
Candison  Credit  only  front  lead  bank  7 of  10 that descrbe  condiions  6 of  9that  got  credit  0  Of10  that describe  conditons  Oof  10  that  got  credit  70d20  tht  describe  conditons  6 of 19 that  got  redit
Satisfy  fin. health  te  5  of  10 that  describe  conditions  4 of  9 that  got credit  3 of  10 that  describe  conditions  3 of 10 that  got  credit  8 d 20 that  descrbe  conditions  7 of 19 that  got credit
Lead  bank  has the  right  of  1st refusa  1 of  10 that  describe  conditions  0of9  that  got  credit  0  o10  tht  describe  conditions  0  of  10 that  got credit  1  of  20 that  descibe  conditions  0  of  19 thai got  cred
Other  conditions  1  of  10 that descibe  conditions  1 ofS  that  got  credit  8 of  10 that  describe  conditions  8 of  10 that  got credit  9 of  22 that  desaibe  conditions  9 of  19 that  got  credit
mtxucontent-tabI  Annex  4: Planned  vs. Actual Operating  Profitability  |
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* 21 Bank  Conciliation  Cases lead by 'WEAK"  Banks  Note  that  in  the  other  19  Bank  Conciliation  Cases  in the
sample  the  financial  part  of  the  Restructuring  Plan  did
* 19 Bank  Conciliation  Cases  lead by "STRONG"  Banks  not  provide  projected  1994  Operating  Profdability.  Note
also  that  an  outlier  (2108)  from  a strong  bank  was
removed:  Planned  operating  profdability:  -13%,  actual
operating  profitability  +9%.
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